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Abstract 
Using a comprehensive panel data analysis of 110 countries over the time span 2002-2012, this study 
investigates the impact of institutional quality on foreign direct investment (FDI) by categorizing the countries 
into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’.The result findings related to developed countries show that a single standard 
deviation change in institutional quality raises FDI by a factor of 0.297 when legal origins are used as 
instruments. On the other hand, the results for the developing countries demonstrate that  institutions do not work 
endogenously with other types of law that govern a country due to an exogeneity issue associated with weak 
structure of institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a global reality and broadly understood to be one of the major determinants of 
economic growth. Since the 1980s, worldwide inflows have increased at a rate of 6% annually, faster than world 
GDP and trade in real terms (Ju and Wei, 2007). The average rate of growth of real GDP in the time span 2005-
2012 was 1.2% for developed countries, 4.3% for transition economies and 6.1% for developing countries. For 
2013, partially estimated figures are 1.0% for developed countries, 2.0% for transition economies and 4.6% for 
developing countries (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014). Total trade in goods and services 
over the time span 2002-2012 fluctuated unevenly. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 broke an upward trend in 
both developed and developing countries. These trends highlight the vulnerability of developing countries, which 
are directly influenced by economic activity in the developed countries (UN, Trade and Development Report, 
2013). The Global Vulnerability Monitor provides a decomposition analysis that measures the size of trade 
shocks relative to world GDP. The impact of trade shocks was 1.9% during the boom period 2004-2007. The 
financial crisis sent a negative shock (-2.7%) in 2009. In the next period, 2010-2011, it was 2.5% (UN, World 
Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014). 
 
Three main factors have increased the importance of the relationship between FDI and institutions. First, the 
study of North (1990) has revealed the increased importance of institutions in boosting investment and economic 
development. Second, with the strong growth in FDI inflows during the last two decades, the transition and 
developed nations have become interested in using institutional reforms to attract more FDI. Third, foreign 
investors are showing more interest in institutional quality when determining which country to invest in (Bevan 
et al., 2004). This paper adds to the existing literature by addressing the following questions: 
(1) Are institutions as a determinant of FDI equally important for both developed and developing 
countries?  
(2) How important are institutions as a determinant of FDI? 
(3) What is the importance of institutions relative to other determinants of FDI?  
Many previous papers and findings have researched the impact of institutional quality on FDI in developing 
and transition economies. We bridge a shortcoming in the literature by comparing the results of both developed 
and developing countries to measure more accurately the importance of institutions in attracting FDI. Many 
previous findings on FDI have been obtained using cross-country studies. Consequently, we have selected a 
large number of countries employing a panel dataset. The dataset includes 110 countries from 2002 to 2012, an 
11-year time span. 
Our paper is compiled and synchronized as follows: In the next section, we briefly summarize the literature 
on the variables that affect FDI, highlighting the importance of institutional quality; in Section 3, we describe our 
research methodology; in Section 4, we concentrate on analyzing results;  Section 5 concludes our paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Why the institutional aspect matters for FDI 
 
Ali et al. (2010) explain that the institutional framework consists of all kinds of humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interactions, including economic exchanges. Institutions can be formal 1  or informal 2  and are 
formulated to reduce uncertainty associated with human interaction and exchange. Therefore, institutions reduce 
uncertainty in a society desiring a predictable framework for economic and human interaction. 
 
     North (1990) explains that institutions affect economic activity via production and transaction costs: Good 
institutions lower the cost of doing business and enhance profitability. Parties at one end of an economic 
exchange may have inadequate information about their counterparts’ true intentions, which might be to decide to 
renege on an agreement. Due to asymmetric information and uncertainty, transactions costs include a risk 
premium.  
 
      Good institutions formulate relationships between foreign and domestic firms and, as a result, generate 
spillover effects. Good and strong institutions promote technology transfer and productivity growth as well as 
crowding-in effects on domestic investment. Uncertainty related to inefficient law enforcement, expropriation 
risk or very weak investor’s protection deter advanced technology investments, which have the highest potential 
for generating knowledge spillovers (Jude and Levieuge, 2013). Bad institutional quality is most likely to attract 
less advanced technology and foreign direct investment, leading to slow economic growth (Blomstrom and 
Kokko, 2003).  
 
      North (1990) explains that institutional quality defines the market rules and structure as well as ensuring that 
economic actions strictly follow these rules. Meyer and Sinani (2009) explain that bad institutions are associated 
with increased risk in long term trade agreements and, as a result, a loosening of ties between foreign and 
domestic firms. Furthermore, technology transfers of multinationals depend upon the host country’s institutional 
environment. In the case of share leakage of technology, multinationals prefer to transfer low technology with 
little spillover potential. 
 
     When reviewing the previous literature on the impact of institutional quality on foreign direct investment, one 
finds mixed evidence of a role for institutional quality in attracting foreign direct investment, suggesting, though 
not confirming, that countries with strong institutions attract more foreign direct investment. Ali et al. (2010) 
find that institutional quality has a positive impact on FDI. They conclude that property rights are important 
determinants of FDI; other institutional factors only impact FDI indirectly through property rights.  
      The mixed results regarding the impact of instutional quality on FDI in the previous literature arise from the 
fact that different measures of institutional quality are used in different parts of the literature. Ali et al. (2010) 
find that institution-based measures of property rights have a very high, positive and statistically significant 
impact on FDI. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) focus on the impact of governance on FDI and find that returns to 
good governance are great for developing economies, relative to other countries in their sample. Rule of law, 
control of corruption, regulatory quality, effectiveness of governance and political stability are highly and 
positively correlated with FDI (Gani, 2007). Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) show that there exists a positive 
relationship between governance and economic growth in a society. 
 
2.2.  Trade 
 
There is a strong and positive correlation between both FDI and trade and economic growth in 66 developing 
countries (Makki and Somwaru, 2004). Trade is considered to be one of the most important variables in much of 
the literature concerning FDI. A trade surplus is thought to be indicative of a healthy economy, and, as a result, 
attracts FDI (Torissi, 1985).  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Constitutions and laws etc 
2
 Conventions and customs 
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2.3.  Inflation 
 
Another important variable is inflation, which measures the internal economic problems and inabilities of a 
government to restrict the money supply and balance its budget. Generally, in most of the literature, it is 
concluded that higher inflation deters FDI (Buchanan et al., 2012). We are using inflation as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. A country which has greater macroeconomic stability and high growth rates will attract 
more FDI inflows than an unstable economy.  
 
 
2.4.   Infrastructure 
 
Rehman et al., (2011) explain that very few researchers have found that infrastructure contributes significantly to 
attracting foreign direct investment.  Those that have include Morrisset (2000), Wheeler and Mody (1992), 
Asiedu (2002) and Kok and Ersoy (2009). Infrastructure consists of railways, roads, highways, telephone lines 
and communication systems, etc. Khadaroo and Seetanah (2010) research mainly the transport infrastructure 
system, along with other important control variables, and find a significant and positive impact of infrastructure 
on FDI. Khadaroo and Seetanah (2010) and Asiedu (2006) explain that infrastructure has different impacts on 
FDI in developed and developing countries. Infrastructure has a significant and positive impact on FDI inflows 
in developing economies. Bae (2008) explains findings from research on developed countries that infrastructure 
is not only a stimulator, but also a good indicator of inflows of FDI. 
 
2.5. Population 
Billington (1999) was the first author to include population as a variable considering population 
density as an important determinant of FDI inflows. Using data for 1970–2005, Oladipo (2008) 
found that market size, human capital, infrastructure and macroeconomic stability are the most 
important determinants of FDI inflows. Using a panel of developing countries, Singh and Jun (1995) 
found that market size, political risk and economic growth significantly determine variations in 
FDI inflows as a share of GDP. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1.  Data 
 
Our sample consists of panel data covering the time period 2002-2012 and 110 countries. We separated the 
countries into ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ according to criteria from World Economic Situation and Prospects, 
2014. Out of 110 countries, there are 69 developing countries (including developing and least developed 
countries and small island developing states) and 41 developed countries (including developed countries and 
economies in transition) which are used separately in our statistical analysis to measure the impact of 
institutional quality on FDI. We end our sample in 2012 because of availability of data in the World 
Development Indicator Database. A list of countries, summary statistics and correlation matrices for all the 
variables of the developed and developing countries are available in Appendix 1 and Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. 
The GDP deflator is a price index used to measure inflation in an economy and formulated as the ratio of the no
minal GDP in a given year to real GDP (multiplied by 100) (McTaggart et al.,1999; McTaggart et al.,1996 ; 
Dornbusch et al., 1995). In this paper, we use a GDP deflator with 2002 as its base1 year for all our countries. 
The main criterion for selection of base2 year is that it should be normal or average and not subject to any major 
economic change. We selected 2002 as base year according to this criterion. Nominal net inflows of FDI are 
measured as balance of payments in current US$. Real, inflation-adjusted inflows of FDI are calculated by 
dividing nominal inflows of FDI  by the GDP deflator. 
     We use a governance variable as a proxy for institutional quality. The dataset is taken from World 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which reports indicators for different countries over the time span 2002-2012.  
There are six dimensions of governance: Control of Corruption; Government Effectiveness; Political Stability; 
Absence of Violence; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Voice and Accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
Indicators that measure public trust in politicians, diversion of public funds, irregular payments in export and 
import, irregular payments in public contracts etc. are included in the Control of Corruption index. The Rule of 
                                                          
1
 According to the World Bank, the base year varies by country. 
2
 Data and Metadata Reporting and presentation handbook - ISBN92-64-03032-8-OECD, 2007, p.116. 
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Law index measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and follow the rule of law; specifically, the 
quality of contracts and enforcement, property rights, the courts, and the police, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. The Regulatory Quality index measures the ability of government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that promote and permit private sector employment. The Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence indices measure the probability that government will be destabilized or 
overthrown in an unconstitutional way; i.e., through politically motivated violence or terrorism. The Government 
Effectiveness index measures the quality of public and civil services, the degree of their independence from 
political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. The Voice and Accountability index measures political rights, civil 
liberties and independence of the media, etc. (World Governance Indicators, 2013). 
      
     Buchanan et al. (2012) explains that governance indicators are highly correlated with one another. Therefore, 
it is not possible to use all of these indicators in a single regression equation. Also, in our case, governance 
indicators are highly correlated with one other for both developed and developing countries. Appendix 2 reports 
the very high correlations among the six governance indicators for both developed and developing countries. The 
correlations between pairs of governance indicators in the case of developing countries are lower than those 
observed in the case of developed countries. The correlations are almost the same as those observed in Buchanan 
et al. in the case of developed countries. In the case of developing countries, the correlations between 
governance indicators have comparatively little similarity to those in Buchanan et al. 
 
      As a result, we follow Buchanan et al. (2012) by extracting the first principal component of the six 
governance indicators, double checking the result with Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis. Applying this 
methodology for both developing and developed countries separately, we put all six governance indicators into 
one aggregate measure: Gov. By comparing the descriptive statistics, we can see that the mean for developed 
countries is 1.77e-07, and the range is [-1.986, 1.323]. For the developing countries, the mean is 2.69e-08 and the 
range is [-2.103, 2.633]. By splitting the countries in two categories, we reduce the range and compare it with the 
results of Buchanan et al., who estimate it to be [-2.421, 2.192]. For developed countries, a mean value of zero 
and standard deviation of 1.0 is similar to the results of Buchanan et al (2012). 
      The literature on FDI tests a large number of variables as its potential determinants. Choosing the set of 
control variables is problematic because the empirical literature suggests dozens of potentially important ones. 
Some of these variables are proposed in various theories of FDI, while others are included because they can be 
linked intuitively (Moosa and Cardak, 2006). Moosa and Cardak (2006) and Chakrabarti (2001) explain that 
trade openness, infrastructure quality and market size are some of the most important determinants of FDI. All 
our macroeconomic variables are taken from the 2013 World Development Indicators Database. We initially 
collected data for approximately 15 macroeconomic variables, including multilateral trade agreement (e.g. 
GATT/WTO) membership, (total) population as a proxy for market size, natural resources, GDP growth rate, 
tariffs and taxes, total number of wage and salaried workers (% of total employed), official exchange rate (LCU 
per US$, period average) etc. Using the literature on FDI determinants and checking the availability of data, we 
chose the most important explanatory variables.  
 
     We took into consideration total trade1, adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator2, to measure trade 
openness in an economy . The inflation rate is measured as the annual percentage change in the consumer price 
index and is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. The “Tele” variable is defined as the number of 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, and it is used to proxy for the quality of infrastructure in a host country 
(Moosa and Cardak, 2006). Tele is expected to be positively correlated with FDI, as good infrastructure attracts 
FDI.  
 
 
4. Regressions and Results 
4.1. Regression Model 
 
We estimate the following model describing the determinants of FDI:  
 
FDI= α + a1 Gov + a2 Trade  + a3 Inflation + a4 Tele + a5 Pop + e (1) 
                                                          
1
 Exports plus imports of good and services (current US $). 
2
 GDP deflator data is obtained from World Bank, WDI, 2013. 
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  The differences in the legal protection of investors provided by destination countries might help in 
understanding why firms are financed and owned so differently. Buchanan and English (2007) argue that 
investors seeking to gain benefits from market returns must choose their investments on the basis of the legal 
foundations of the countries in which they invest. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) developed a relationship 
between financial markets and legal environments known as LLSV in which the origin of the legal code is an 
important determinant of governance, and financial markets attract FDI through security of property rights. 
David and Brierley (1985) state that legal foundations can be categorized into different families, i.e. English, 
French, Scandinavian and German, and two primary legal systems, i.e. civil and common. The same 
classification is also applied by Shleifer et al. (2000). Legal codes are classified according to their origins as 
follows: English (ENGLAW); French (FRELAW); Scandinavian (SCANLAW); German (GERLAW); and 
Socialist (SOCLAW). Socialist law has the disadvantage that all formerly communist countries are included in 
this category, so the role of the legal system may be vitiated by other factors (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). 
Using an instrumental variable (IV) methodology, in our first model, IVa, we, therefore, measure governance 
using the dataset “The Quality of Government” (La Porta et al., 1999), but excluding the SOCLAW category.  
 
     For IVb, we took into consideration common law, civil law, using data from the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Ottawa1, and lagged values of the independent variables. Pure common law has its origins in 
English law. Civil law derives from Roman law and applies to all those countries with their legal origins in 
French, German and Scandinavian law. French, German and common (English) law have spread around the 
world through all kinds of combinations of conquest, imperialism and other means. Civil law gives investors 
weaker legal rights and a lower quality of law enforcement, with French civil law providing the least protection. 
German and Scandinavian civil law provide the highest quality of law enforcement, but an average degree of 
protection. Common law (English origin) provides the next highest quality of law enforcement and also the 
highest protection (La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
      Using the IV methodology, we employ all four of the legal origin(legor_uk, legor_fr, legor_ge, legor_sc) as 
instruments for governance. For developed countries, all four instruments were highly significant in first stage 
regressions. When applied to the developing countries, only three instruments were highly significant in first 
stage regressions, and the Scandinavian origin was omitted due to collinearity. For this reason, we employed 
only three legal origin instruments (legor_uk, legor_fr, legor_ge) for both developed and developing countries.  
 
 4.2.  Results for Developed Countries 
In Table 5, we report results of an OLS regression with FDI as the dependent variable in Column (1).  In 
accordance with the literature on endogeneity, we have a potential bias within our OLS results (Buchanan et al., 
2012; Benassy-Quere et al., 2007; Daude and Stein, 2007; Hall and Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995). Countries are not 
exogenously gifted with the institutions that promote good governance. In fact, governance is determined 
endogenously, depending on the type of law that governs the country, the legal origins, and the level of 
economic development (Buchanan et al., 2012). According to Wooldridge (2000, p. 472), IV methods are 
intended to correct for such endogeneity. Buchanan et al. (2012), Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and 
Daud and Stein (2007), all used instrumental variables in their analyses. Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeneity showed a significant p-value (0.0551), indicating endogeneity of governance and supporting 
the use of legal origins as instruments for it. 
      Column (2) reports IV results using European legal origins as instruments. The results for the Gov variable in 
Column (2) show that a one standard deviation change in institutional quality improves FDI by a factor of 0.297, 
using English, French, and German legal origins as instruments. Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity of Gov showed a significant p-value (0.0009), supporting the use of legal origins as instruments. 
The coefficient on Trade is positive and significant; countries more open to trade attract more inflows of FDI. 
The coefficient on Tele, a proxy for infrastructure, is significant but negative, implying that if infrastructure is 
under developed, low FDI inflows can result. The coefficient on inflation, a proxy for macroeconomic stability, 
is significant and positive, implying that a more stable macroeconomic environment can attract FDI. The 
coefficient on Pop, a proxy for market size, is positive but insignificant. The relationship between governance 
and the instrumental variables is explained in Appendix 3: Correlation between governance and instrumental 
variables – developed countries. 
       Column (3) reports IV results using common law, commercial law and lagged values of the independent 
variables as instruments. Results for developed countries show that a one standard deviation change in 
institutional quality decreases FDI by a factor of 0.105. The coefficient on Trade is significant and positive. The 
coefficients on Tele and Pop are significant, but with negative signs. The coefficient on inflation is insignificant 
                                                          
1
 http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/ 
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with a positive sign. When using lagged values of independent variables as instruments along with common law 
and civil law, we find a negative relationship between Gov and FDI because our control variables (Tele and Pop) 
are significant with negative signs. Thus, to have a positive and significant relationship between institutional 
quality and FDI, the behavior of important macroeconomic variables also plays a pivotal role. 
4.3.   Results For Developing Countries 
In Table 6, the simple OLS regression with FDI as the dependent variable in Column (1) shows that Gov has a 
positive and significant effect on FDI. The statistical results imply that good institutions tend to attract foreign 
direct investment. The coefficient on Trade is positive and highly significant. Countries that are open to trade 
and investment opportunities can attract FDI inflows. The coefficient on Tele, used as a proxy for measuring 
infrastructure, is also highly significant and positive, which implies that if infrastructure is more developed, FDI 
inflows will increase. The coefficient on Pop, a proxy for market size, is positive but insignificant  
 
       In accordance with the literature on endogeneity, we have a potential bias within our OLS results (Buchanan 
et al., 2012; Benassy-Quere et al., 2007; Daude and Stein, 2007; Hall and Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995).  
Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of the governance variable has an insignificant p-
value (0.1143) and does not reject the null hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates. The results are reported in 
Column (2) in Table 6. On the other hand, Gov can also be treated as exogenous using common law, commercial 
law and lagged values of independent variables as instruments because the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity of governance has an insignificant p-value (0.1668), suggesting that Gov is not working 
endogenously with other types of law that govern a country due to weak institutional quality. One may infer 
from statistical findings that institutions in developing countries are not strong enough to work endogenously 
with other types of laws to attract foreign direct investment. Institutions need to be strong enough to work well 
with other types of laws and macroeconomic factors to attract foreign direct investment. The correlation between 
governance and instrumental variables is explained in Appendix 4: Correlation between governance and 
instrumental variables – developing countries. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using panel data for 110 countries covering 2002-2012, we examine the impact of institutional quality on 
foreign direct investment by categorizing the countries into ‘developed’ and ‘developing’. We find that 
institutional quality has a significant and positive effect on foreign direct investment inflows in the case of 
developed countries, using legal origins as instruments (a one standard deviation change in institutional quality 
raises FDI by a factor of 0.297). Using lagged values of independent variables as instruments, along with 
common law and civil law, we find a negative relationship between institutional quality and FDI, since our 
proxies for infrastructure and market size are significant with negative signs. Thus, the behavior of important 
macroeconomic variables also plays a pivotal role in determining the relationship between FDI and institutional 
quality. In contrast, our findings for developing countries provide partial or little support for the hypothesis that 
institutional quality impacts foreign direct investment in the presence of poor and weakly-structured institutions. 
One may infer from the overall results that policies intended to attract foreign direct investment inflows by 
providing a better and more stable macroeconomic environment will be futile without strong and efficient 
institutions. 
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Appendix 1 
List Of Developed and Transition Economies 
No. Country Code No. Country Code 
1 Albania ALB 22 Japan JPN 
2 Armenia ARM 23 Kazakhstan KAZ 
3 Australia AUS 24 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ 
4 Austria AUT 25 Luxembourg LUX 
5 Azerbaijan AZE 26 Macedonia, FYR MKD 
6 Belarus BLR 27 Moldova MDA 
7 Belgium BEL 28 Netherlands NLD 
8 Bulgaria BGR 29 New Zealand NZL 
9 Canada CAN 30 Norway NOR 
10 Croatia HRV 31 Poland POL 
11 Czech Republic CZE 32 Portugal PRT 
12 Denmark DNK 33 Romania ROM 
13 Estonia EST 34 RussianFederation RUS 
14 Finland FIN 35 Spain ESP 
15 France FRA 36 Sweden SWE 
16 Georgia GEO 37 Switzerland CHE 
17 Germany DEU 38 Tajikistan TJK 
18 Greece GRC 39 Ukraine UKR 
19 Iceland ISL 40 United Kingdom GBR 
20 Ireland IRL 41 United States USA 
21 Italy ITA       
Source: UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014 
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List of Developing and Least Developed Countries and Small Islands Developing States 
No. Country Code No. Country Code 
1 Algeria DZA 36 Lao PDR LAO 
2 Antigua and Barbuda ATG 37 Lesotho LSO 
3 Bahamas, The BHS 38 Macao SAR, China MAC 
4 Bangladesh BGD 39 Malaysia MYS 
5 Barbados BRB 40 Mauritania MRT 
6 Bolivia BOL 41 Mauritius MUS 
7 Botswana BWA 42 Mexico MEX 
8 Brazil BRA 43 Mongolia MNG 
9 Brunei Darussalam BRN 44 Morocco MAR 
10 Burundi BDI 45 Mozambique MOZ 
11 Cabo Verde CPV 46 Nicaragua NIC 
12 Cameroon CMR 47 Niger NER 
13 China CHN 48 Nigeria NGA 
14 Colombia COL 49 Pakistan PAK 
15 Costa Rica CRI 50 Panama PAN 
16 Dominica DMA 51 Paraguay PRY 
17 Dominican Republic DOM 52 Peru PER 
18 Ecuador ECU 53 Philippines PHL 
19 Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 54 Rwanda RWA 
20 El Salvador SLV 55 Sao Tome and Principe STP 
21 Ethiopia ETH 56 Senegal SEN 
22 Fiji FJI 57 Singapore SGP 
23 Gabon GAB 58 South Africa ZAF 
24 Ghana GHA 59 Sri Lanka LKA 
25 Grenada GRD 60 St. Lucia LCA 
26 Guatemala GTM 61 St. Vincent and the Grenadines VCT 
27 Guinea-Bissau GNB 62 Sudan SDN 
28 Haiti HTI 63 Tanzania TZA 
29 Honduras HND 64 Thailand THA 
30 Hong Kong SAR, China HKG 65 Tunisia TUN 
31 India IND 66 Turkey TUR 
32 Indonesia IDN 67 Uruguay URY 
33 Jordan JOR 68 Vanuatu VUT 
34 Kenya KEN 69 Vietnam VNM 
35 Korea, Rep. KOR       
 Source: UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Correlation of Governance Indicators – Developed Countries 
 
Notes: ‘C. of Corruption’ is control of corruption; ‘Gov. Effect.’ is government effectiveness; ‘Reg. Quality’ is regulatory quality; ‘Rule’ is 
rule of law; ‘Voice ACC’ is voice and accountability. 
 
Correlation of Governance Indicators – Developing Countries 
 
Notes: ‘C. of Corruption’ is control of corruption; ‘Gov. Effect.’ is government effectiveness; ‘Reg. Quality’ is regulatory quality; ‘Rule’ is 
rule of law; ‘Voice ACC’ is voice and accountability. 
 
Appendix 3: Correlations between Governance and Instrument variables – Developed Countries 
  gov legor_uk legor_fr legor_ge comlaw civlaw 
gov 1.0000 
legor_uk 0.3481 1.0000 
legor_fr 0.2220 -0.2039 1.0000 
legor_ge 0.2666 -0.1361 -0.1619 1.0000 
comlaw 0.3481 1.0000 -0.2039 -0.1361 1.0000 
civlaw -0.3581 -0.9125 0.2234 -0.0693 -0.9125 1.0000 
Notes: ‘legor_uk’ is UK legal origin; ‘legor_fr’ is  French legal origin; ‘legor_ge’ is German legal origin; ‘comlaw’ is common law; ‘civlaw’ 
is civil law. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Correlations between Governance and Instrument Variables – Developing Countries 
  gov legor_uk legor_fr legor_ge comlaw civlaw 
gov 1.0000 
legor_uk 0.3510 1.0000 
legor_fr -0.3112 -0.8609 1.0000 
legor_ge 0.1598 -0.0943 -0.1343 1.0000 
comlaw 0.3906 0.4321 -0.3720 -0.0407 1.0000 
civlaw -0.1031 -0.4678 0.4304 -0.0830 -0.2299 1.0000 
Notes: ‘legor_uk’ is UK legal origin; ‘legor_fr’ is French legal origin; ‘legor_ge’ is German legal origin; ‘comlaw’ is common law; ‘civlaw’ 
is civil law. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Developed Countries 
  FDI Gov Trade Inflation Tele Pop 
Mean 9.601 1.77e-07 10.989 4.421 1.526 7.038 
Maximum 11.473 1.323 12.602 59.220 1.870 8.496 
Minimum 6.640 -1.986 8.974 -4.480 0.577 5.458 
Std.dev. 0.9114 1 0.893 5.753 0.261 .626 
No. of Obs. 451 451 451 451 451 451 
No. of 
Countries 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Note: The table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the major variables in this study for developed countries. FDI is measured as net 
inflows (balance of payments in current US$) divided by a GDP deflator with 2002 as base year. Real Trade – imports plus exports divided 
by the GDP deflator - describes the openness of the economy. Inflation - consumer prices (annual % change) - is used as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. Tele - number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants - is used to proxy for the quality of infrastructure in the host 
country. 
Source: World Developed Indicators (WDI), 2013 database. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics – Developing Countries 
  FDI Gov Trade  Inflation Tele Pop 
Mean 8.638 2.69e-08 10.063  6.287 0.805 6.918 
Maximum 11.251 2.633 12.427  51.461 1.792 9.130 
Minimum 1.031 -2.103 7.637  -3.503 -0.776 4.843 
Std.dev. 1.047 1 0.944  5.896 0.637 .989 
No. of Obs. 759 759 759  759 759 759 
No. of Countries 69 69 69  69 69 69 
Note: The table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the major variables in this study for developed countries. FDI is measured as net 
inflows (balance of payments in current US$) divided by a GDP deflator with 2002 as base year. Real Trade – imports plus exports divided 
by the GDP deflator - describes the openness of the economy. Inflation - consumer prices (annual % change) - is used as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. Tele - number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants - is used to proxy for the quality of infrastructure in the host 
country. 
Source: World Developed Indicators (WDI), 2013 database. 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix – Developed Countries 
  FDI Gov Trade  Inflation Tele Pop 
FDI 1.0000  
Gov 0.6174 1.0000  
Trade 0.8742 0.6902 1.0000  
Inflation -0.3318 -0.5257 -0.3735  1.0000 
Tele  0.6199  0.7737  0.7228  -0.3087 1.0000 
Pop 0.5219 -0.0106 0.6493  -0.0333 0.1709 1.0000 
Note: The table summarizes the correlations between the major variables in this study for developed countries. FDI is measured as net 
inflows (balance of payments in current US$) divided by a GDP deflator with 2002 as base year. Real Trade – imports plus exports divided 
by the GDP deflator - describes the openness of the economy. Inflation - consumer prices (annual % change) - is used as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. Tele - number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants - is used to proxy for the quality of infrastructure in the host 
country. 
Source: World Developed Indicators (WDI), 2013 database. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix – Developing Countries 
         FDI                Gov      Trade      Inflation  Tele Pop 
FDI 1.0000 
Gov 0.2341 1.0000 
Trade 0.8587 0.1294 1.0000 
Inflation -0.0872 -0.3107 -0.0996 1.0000 
Tele 0.4229 0.7161 0.352 -0.2665 1.0000 
Pop 0.5315 -0.4866 0.7155 0.1913 -0.2784 1.0000 
Note: The table summarizes the correlation for the major variables in this study for developing countries. FDI is measured as net inflows 
(balance of payments in current US$) divided by a GDP deflator with 2002 as base year. Real Trade – imports plus exports divided by the 
GDP deflator - describes the openness of the economy. Inflation - consumer prices (annual % change) - is used as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability. Tele - number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants - is used to proxy for the quality of infrastructure in the host 
country. 
Source: World Developed Indicators (WDI), 2013 database. 
 
                       Table 5: FDI and Governance – Panel Regressions for Developed Countries 
Independent variables 
OLS  
IV ᵃ IV ᵇ 
  2SLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -.723* 1.314* -.595 
  (-1.76)  (1.70)  -1.41  
Gov -.100** .297*** -.105* 
  (-1.90)  (2.15)  -1.84  
Trade 1.192*** .764*** 1.185*** 
  (15.89)  (4.75)  13.71  
Inflation .001 .011** .002 
  (0.33)  (2.06)  0.62  
Tele -.345*** -.573*** -.331** 
  (-2.51)  (-3.43)  -2.25  
Pop -.320*** .101 -.330*** 
  (-4.23)  (0.64)  -3.93  
No. of countries 41 41 41 
No. of observations 
(strongly balanced) 451 451 451 
R² 0.774 0.747 0.774 
F Statistic 271.87     
Wald chi2   1383.24 1406.75 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: The dependent variable is foreign direct investment, net inflows (balance of payments in current US$) divided by GDP deflator with 
2002 as base year. t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
White’s heteroscedasticity correction is applied to the OLS regression and fixed effects models.  
ᵃ Instrument variables are legal origin.  
ᵇ Instrument variables are common law and civil law. Log values are used to measure real FDI inflows, real Trade,Tele and Pop. Goodness-
of-fit is not a factor; p-values are in the parentheses. 
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                       Table 6: FDI and Governance – Panel Regressions for Developing Countries 
Independent variables 
OLS  
IV ᵃ IV ᵇ 
  2SLS 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -.736** -1.014*** -.494** 
  (-2.15) (-3.33) (-2.11) 
Gov .072** -.090 .083** 
  (2.23) (-0.82) (2.46) 
Trade .929*** 1.072*** .892*** 
  (13.18) (9.77) (15.41) 
Inflation .007 0.008** 0.006* 
  (1.56)  (2.28)  (1.80)  
Tele .138*** .173*** .132** 
  (3.15) (2.92) (2.57)  
Pop -.020 -.192 .004 
  (-0.33) (-1.53) (0.07) 
No. of countries 69 69 69 
No. of observations 
(strongly balanced) 759 759 759 
R² 0.757 0.750 0.785 
F Statistic 437.19     
Wald chi2   2303 2533.75 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: The dependent variable is foreign direct investment, net inflows (balance of payments in current US$) divided by GDP deflator with 
2002 as base year. t-statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
White’s heteroscedasticity correction is applied to the OLS regression and fixed effects models.  
ᵃ Instrument variables are legal origin.  
ᵇ Instrument variables are common law and civil law. Log values are used to measure real FDI inflows, real Trade,Tele and Pop. Goodness-
of-fit is not a factor; p-values are in the parentheses. 
 
 
 
